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Strike ballot law and practice in the United 
States: Order without law in labour 
relations?
Alexander J S Colvin*
This article reviews strike ballot law and practice in the United States. The 
US has had only limited experience with strike ballot laws. The most 
extensive use o f strike ballots was under emergency wartime legislation 
during World War II. Strike ballots were later required under the national 
emergency dispute provisions o f the Taft-Hartley Act o f 1947. Although used 
in some major disputes from the late 1940s to early 1970s, these provisions 
subsequently fell into disuse. In recent decades there has been little interest 
in revival o f strike ballot laws in the US The article argues that the reasons 
for this neglect include a perception that these laws were unsuccessful in 
reducing strikes in the US and that American employers had other legal 
tactics available to limit union strike power. The article concludes by 
describing how despite the absence o f strike ballot mandates in labour law, 
many American unions require strike authorisation votes in their union 
constitutions and strike authorisation ballots are widely used in practice. This 
development o f rules and norms of practice in the absence o f legal 
mandates provides an example of the emergence of ‘order without law’ in the 
labour relations realm.
Introduction
The labour relations system in the US is often characterised by its 
exceptionalism from other national systems. The US is the paradigmatic 
liberal market economy, with weakly regulated labour markets, poorly 
institutionalised unions, and an attenuated voice for labour in the political 
realm.* 1 Even as other English speaking countries have moved towards models 
emphasising decentralised private economic ordering with a more limited role 
for collective bargaining and an emphasis on employment law as providing 
minimum standards, the US has retained its distinctiveness compared to other 
countries following this Anglo-American model due to its strongly 
pro-employer and weak labour approach.2 Strike law provides one of the 
signature elements of the American employer-favourable model of labour law. 
The Wagner Act model of labour law in the US establishes the strike as the 
primary mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses and explicitly 
recognises the right to strike. Some of the limitations on the right to strike in 
US labour law, such as the ban on secondary boycotts, parallel provisions 
found in the labour laws of other countries. Where American strike law
* Professor o f Labor Relations and Conflict Resolution, Cornell University. I would like to 
thank Bradley Weinberg for his very able research assistance on this project.
1 P A Hall and D Soskice (Eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
2 A J S Colvin and O Darbishire, ‘Convergence in Industrial Relations Institutions: The 
Emerging Anglo-American Model?’ (2013) 66 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 1047.
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diverges from other countries is in its much more pro-employer treatment of 
strike breakers or replacement workers.
In the area of strike ballot laws, we find further evidence of American 
exceptionalism. However, perhaps surprisingly, America is an exception in 
this area in the limited extent or general absence of strike ballot requirements. 
While there are strike ballot requirements in the narrow category of national 
emergency disputes and under some state public sector labour laws, for the 
vast majority of collective bargaining settings in the private sector and in most 
states in the public sector there is no legal requirement that a strike ballot be 
held. This article will explore the history of strike ballot laws in the US and 
consider the policy debates concerning their adoption. The story here will be 
one of ‘the dog that didn’t bark’. The lack of adoption of strike ballot laws in 
the US may tell us much about the reasons these provisions are adopted in 
other countries. The article will also explore the widespread use of strike 
ballots by American unions in the absence of legal mandates. In this area, we 
can see the emergence of a form of ‘Order without Law’ in the labour relations 
realm.3
US Strike Law Background
The regulation of strikes has long been a central issue in American labour law. 
In the early nineteenth century, the American common law considered unions 
to be criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade. The criminal conspiracy rule 
was replaced in the mid-nineteenth century by the means-ends doctrine,4 
which accorded unions permission to exist but regulated their activities based 
on whether the courts judged the means they used to be lawful. Central to the 
means inquiry were issues of strike activity. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the US courts liberally granted employer requests for 
labour injunctions limiting union strike actions. Unions’ legal jeopardy for 
strike action was further increased with the passage of the Sherman Act in 
1890, which, while designed to provide antitrust regulation of businesses, 
raised the specter of union collective action being similarly classified as 
unlawful anti-competitive behavior. This danger was dramatically realised in 
the famous Danbury Hatters case of 1908, where striking members of the 
Hatmakers union were found to have engaged in unlawful antitrust activities 
and held individually personally liable for the employer’s substantial losses, 
with the damages tripled under the punitive provisions of the Sherman Act.
The Clayton Act of 1914 was the first legislative effort to limit the 
restrictive impact of labour injunctions on strikes. It declared that ‘Labor is 
not a commodity’, intended to avoid application of antitrust law to union 
activities. However a remarkably narrow reading of the Clayton Act’s 
provisions by the US Supreme Court rendered this statute ineffective in
3 The idea of ‘Order without Law’ was explored by Robert Ellickson in his book of that name 
that investigated the development of property rules among cattle ranchers in Northern 
California that occurred in the absence of legal enforcement: R C Ellickson, Order without 
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1991.
4 Commonwealth v Hunt 45 Mass 111 (1842).
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limiting labour injunctions.5 More substantial limitations on the US courts’ 
common law based hostility to strike actions would have to await the passage 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which expressly barred the courts from 
issuing injunctions in labour disputes. Norris-LaGuardia represents a 
high-water mark for voluntarism in American labour law, with the prospect of 
the US following the British path of deregulation of industrial action. 
However with the intensifying economic crisis of the Great Depression, 
labour policy in the US soon shift toward elforts to establish a more extensive, 
and initially pro-collective bargaining, approach to regulating labour relations.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), initially passed as the Wagner 
Act of 1935, established a comprehensive set of laws governing private sector 
labour relations in the US. The NLRA sets out rules governing union 
organising, recognition and legal certification of union representation, the 
conduct of bargaining, and the use of industrial action, including strikes. In 
many areas, the NLRA approach represented a relatively detailed regulatory 
structure for the conduct of labour relations. For example, union recognition 
was to be based on collective representation of legally defined bargaining 
units with majority status determined by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), increasingly through formal, secret ballot elections following 
extended campaigns. By contrast, the NLRA continued the Norris-LaGuardia 
approach of relatively light regulation of strike activity. Section 7 of the 
NLRA recognised the right of employees to engage in ‘concerted activity’ for 
‘mutual aid and protection’, providing legal protection for both formal strikes 
and informal industrial action. Section 13 of the NLRA further declared that 
the Act did not in any way limit the right to strike, thereby preserving the 
Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions of labour injunctions.6
Subsequent amendments to the NLRA, most notably the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947, did introduce some limitations to strike action. In particular, these 
amendments limited recognition picketing and the use of secondary boycott 
strikes.7 The more substantial limitations on strike activity in US labour law 
have emerged not from new legislative initiatives, but rather from 
interpretations of the NLRA provisions by the courts. Most famously in its 
1938 Mackay Radio8 decision, the US Supreme Court held that American 
employers did not commit an unfair labour practice by promising permanent 
employment to replacement workers hired during a strike and that so long as 
those permanent replacement workers occupied their jobs, the strikers had no 
right to reinstatement even if they abandoned their strike. Although subject to 
an important exception where the strike in question was the result of an unfair 
labour practice, such as a failure to bargain in good faith, the Mackay Radio 
doctrine provides American employers with a powerful weapon to defeat 
strikes and in many cases eliminate union representation as non-union 
permanent replacements take away the jobs of the strikers. For a number of
5 Duplex Printing Press Co v Deering 254 US 443 (1921). This case interprets the Clayton 
Act’s labour provision as being ‘but declaratory of the law as it stood before’.
6 NLRA s 13: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be 
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike 
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
7 NLRA s 8(b)(4).
8 National Labor Relations Board v Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co 304 US 333 (1938).
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decades, the Mackay Radio doctrine lay fallow as permanent replacement of 
strikers was considered beyond the pale of the norms of American labour 
relations practices. However following President Reagan’s dramatic firing in 
1981 of air traffic controllers who had engaged in an illegal strike, employers 
began to use permanent replacements as an increasingly normal weapon to 
defeat strikes.9 From the 1980s onward, strikes became steadily less frequent 
and the strike threat a much less potent weapon for unions in collective 
bargaining. The result is that while American labour law became increasingly 
ossified over time,10 with the last major amendments to the NLRA being the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, interpretation and 
shifts in practice have increased the arguably already pro-employer tilt of 
US labour law.
The Law of Strike Ballots in the US
As initially enacted in 1935, the NLRA did not contain any requirement for 
strike ballots. Strike ballots first appear in US labour law during World War II 
under the wartime War Labor Disputes Act (the Smith-Connally Act).11 This 
wartime legislation sought to limit the danger of industrial disputes interfering 
with wartime production. It established the War Labor Board to supervise 
industrial relations during the war and provided a series of limitations on 
strikes, including the ability of the government to seize workplaces necessary 
to the war effort where strikes had occurred. For any private sector 
establishment during the war period, the Smith-Connally Act required 30-day 
notice of an intention to strike and required that the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) conduct a secret-ballot vote among the members of the 
bargaining unit on the major issues in bargaining prior to the strike.12 Over 
2000 strike votes were conducted by the end of the war, with the large 
majority showing majority support for the strikes.13 Despite this extensive 
wartime experience with a strike ballot law, the provisions of the 
Smith-Connally Act lapsed with the end of the war and the return to 
peace-time labour law.
Strike ballots next emerged as an issue in American labour law with the 
passage of the major Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA in 1947. 
Inspired by a political reaction to the post-war strike wave of 1945^-6, the 
Taft-Hartley Act reshaped the NLRA to limit what were perceived by its 
crafters as excesses of industrial conflict and union power.14 Notably the 
Taft-Hartley Act added union unfair labour practices to the NLRA and 
introduced a series of limitations on strikes, including a ban on secondary
9 The best account of how this process played out is provided in: J D Rosenblum, Copper 
Crucible: How the Arizona Miners’ Strike of 1983 Recast Labor-Management Relations in 
America, ILR Press, Ithaca NY, 1998.
10 C L Estlund, ‘The Ossification of American Labor Law’ (2002) 102 Colum L Rev 1527.
11 See F R Anton, ‘Are Strike Ballots Necessary?’ (1970) 13(2) California Management 
Review 5.
12 Ibid, at 6.
13 Anton, above n i l ,  reports that 82% of individual voters were in favor of the strikes and the 
strikes had majority support in 85% of the votes.
14 D E Cullen, ‘The Taft-Hartley Act in National Emergency Disputes’ (1953) 7 Indus & Lab 
Rel Rev 15 at 19.
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boycotts and restrictions on recognition picketing. The Taft-Hartley Act also 
included provisions allowing the President to intervene in a national 
emergency dispute, defined as ‘a threatened or actual strike or lockout 
affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof . . .  [which] will, if 
permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety . .  ,’.15 
These provisions allow the Attorney-General to seek a temporary injunction 
from the federal courts that would provide an 80-day cooling off period before 
the strike or lockout could occur. During the first 60 days of the cooling-off 
period, federal mediators seek to resolve the dispute. If this mediation is 
unsuccessful, the NLRB then has 15 days to conduct a vote among the 
employees on management’s final offer and a further 5 days to tally the votes 
before a strike can occur.16
During the initial quarter century after its passage, the national emergency 
dispute provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act were invoked in a number of 
disputes. Charles Rehmus reports eight disputes from 1947—49 in which the 
national emergency provisions were invoked, nine national emergency 
disputes from 1950-59, 12 from 1960-69, and a further five occurring in 1971 
alone.17 Following the initial stage of the temporary injunction cooling off 
period, 17 of these disputes reached the stage of a pre-strike ballot on the 
employer’s final offer. In 15 of these disputes, the outcome of the ballot was 
that a large majority of the employees rejected the final offer. In one of the 
other disputes the outcome was never announced and in the last dispute no 
ballots at all were cast after the union members decided to boycott the vote. 
In no dispute over this quarter century period did the ballot on the employer’s 
final offer result in the settlement of the dispute. Rehmus describes the 
conclusion from this experience as being that final offer ballots were a failure: 
‘The prediction of the disutility of final offer ballots contained in President 
Truman’s veto message in 1947 was fulfilled . . .  [G]ovemment administrators 
have concluded such polls are useless in settling disputes’.18
The national emergency dispute procedures fell into disuse from the 1970s 
onward. The only other attempt to invoke them in the 1970s was an attempt 
by President Carter to obtain an injunction against the coal strike of 1977-78 
that was rejected by the courts. After this failed attempt, the procedures were 
not used again until 2002, when President Bush obtained a national emergency 
dispute temporary injunction to halt a lockout of dockworkers in the West 
Coast ports.19 This dispute was settled through mediation during the cooling 
off period before any final offer ballot was held.20 Although there have been 
calls as recently as a 2015 dockworkers strike to again invoke the procedures, 
no subsequent use of the national emergency dispute procedures has been 
made. Although the provisions remain in the statute, at present the final offer 
ballot procedures under the NLRA are an inactive relic of an earlier, higher
15 Labor Management Relations Act o f 1947 29 USC § 401-531 s 206.
16 Labor Management Relations Act o f 1947 29 USC § 401-531 s 209(a).
17 C M Rehmus ‘Emergency Strikes Revisited’ (1990) 43 Ind & Lab Rel Rev 175.
18 Ibid, at 177.
19 D E Sanger and S Greenhouse, ‘President Invokes Taft-Hartley Act to Open 29 Ports’, New 
York Times, 9 October 2002.
20 S Greenhouse, ‘Both Sides See Gains in Deal to End Port Labor Dispute’, New York Times, 
25 November 2002.
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conflict era in American labour relations.
Another potential source of strike ballot regulation in the US is state labour 
relations statutes. During the 1930s and 1940s, some states enacted 
comprehensive labour relations statutes seeking to regulate private sector 
labour relations activity and disputes. While paralleling the provisions of the 
NLRA in many respects, some of these statutes also included additional 
requirements for a secret ballot majority vote to authorise a legal strike. State 
labour relations statutes with strike ballot requirements remain on the books 
in the States of Colorado,21 Michigan,22 Minnesota,23 and Wisconsin.24 25
However in regards to private sector labour relations, the provisions of these 
statutes are largely pre-empted under the US Supreme Court’s Garmon 
pre-emption doctrine.23 Jurisdiction over labour relations in the US rests 
primarily at the federal level and federal legislation pre-empts any state level 
statutes relating to labour in the same area. Under the Garmon pre-emption 
doctrine, it is not necessary that the NLRA contain a similar provision or 
remedy to that provided for in the state law to trigger pre-emption, only that 
the state law attempt to regulate conduct that is arguably regulated by the 
NLRA.26 Although this doctrine has not been applied in any case where there 
was an attempt to enforce a state labour relations statute strike ballot 
provision, it appears clear that the Garmon doctrine would require 
pre-emption in such a case. Under the NLRA, employees have a right to 
engage in a strike unfettered by any strike ballot requirement, so to require 
such a ballot under state law would interfere with the regulatory scheme of the 
federal statute. This conclusion is reinforced by the choice of Congress to add 
a strike ballot requirement for national emergency disputes under the 
Taft-Hartley Act amendments, but not to add such a requirement for other 
labour disputes. As a result, these state statutes only apply to labour relations 
in small employers not covered by the NLRA. Given the very low level of 
unionisation among these small employers, the state statutes have little to no 
practical impact.
While the NLRA establishes federal pre-emption of state regulation of 
private sector labour relations, the states retain authority to regulate public 
sector labour relations within the state. Beginning with Wisconsin in 1959, 
most American states passed statutes allowing collective bargaining by public 
sector employees, albeit a few states continue to make public sector 
bargaining illegal.27 Although most states now allow collective bargaining, 
most prohibit strikes by public sector employees and instead provide for 
interest arbitration to resolve bargaining impasses. However a few states do 
allow at least some public sector employees the right to strike, generally with 
qualifications concerning the types of workers involved or prior use of dispute
21 Colorado Labor Peace Act, passed in 1943.
22 Michigan Labor Relations and Mediation Act, passed in 1939.
23 Minnesota Labor Relations Act, passed in 1939.
24 Wisconsin Employment Relations Act, passed in 1937.
25 San Diego Unions v Garmon 359 US 236 (1959).
26 Wright Elec Inc v Ouellette 686 NW 2d 313 (2004).
27 See ‘Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector’, in H C Katz, T A Kochan and A J S Colvin, 
An Introduction to Collective Bargaining & Industrial Relations, McGraw Hill/lrwin, 
Boston MA, 2007, chap 13.
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resolution mechanisms, which in two states also include strike ballot 
requirements. In the State of Alaska, school employees are allowed to engage 
in a strike if the dispute is initially subject to advisory interest arbitration, they 
give the employer 72 hours notice, and a majority of the employees vote in 
favour of the strike in a secret ballot. Similarly in the Illinois education system 
employees are allowed to engage in strikes, however the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Act requires that three-quarters of the bargaining unit approve 
the strike through a secret ballot vote. Despite this supra-majority 
requirement, Illinois teachers unions have been able to successfully obtain 
strike authorisation from their members. In the most prominent recent 
example, in September 2012 the Chicago Teachers Union launched its first 
strike in 25 years, having received the support of nearly 90% of bargaining 
unit members in a strike ballot. This example, though, illustrates a major 
limitation of using strike ballot laws to limit industrial conflict. The strike 
ballot vote had been held in June 2012, while bargaining was still underway, 
with the union leadership explicitly stating the purpose of the vote was to 
obtain bargaining leverage at the negotiating table.28 In practice, strike ballots 
can often serve in this way as a method of increasing pressure on the employer 
in bargaining, rather than as a mechanism to dissuade the union from striking. 
This may explain the lack of strike ballot law requirements in other US states 
that allow public sector strikes.29
American Debates on Strike Ballots
American policy debates about the desirability of strike ballot laws have 
responded to the historical experience with these laws. Ballots received 
greater attention during the immediate postwar period after the experience of 
the wartime ballot laws and the then-new Taft-Hartley national emergency 
dispute provisions. However many argued that this experience had shown the 
lack of utility of final offer ballots as a tool for resolving disputes and avoiding 
strikes. Donald Cullen, a leading industrial relations academic during the 
postwar period, described this view in a 1953 article:
The discredited assumption that union leaders do not represent the wishes of the 
workers is not the only weakness of this provision, however, for the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Services has pointed out that the ballot can seriously 
impede bargaining. Since the employer knows that a vote against his last proposal 
is likely and will serve as a mandate for the union officers to get more, he keeps 
something in reserve when he makes his nominal last offer; but the union negotiators 
know he is doing this and they react accordingly . . .  Fortunately, the futility of the 
last-offer ballot is now widely recognized, even on Capital Hill.30
Arguments continued to be advanced in favor of legislation that would require 
a strike ballot before a union would be in a legal strike position. In addition
28 N Ahmed-Ullah and J Hood, ‘CTU: Nearly 90 percent o f Teachers Vote to Authorize Strike’, 
Chicago Tribune, 11 June 2012.
29 Another state that may require public sector strike ballots is Colorado. Although initially 
intended to apply to private sector employees, the strike ballot provisions in Colorado’s 
Labor Peace Act arguably apply to public sector strikes, which are now permitted in that 
state.
30 Cullen, above n 11, at 27.
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to the instrumental argument that strike ballots would reduce the incidence of 
strikes, these arguments emphasised the importance of secret ballots to allow 
employees to express their true feelings about an impending strike.31 By the 
1970s and 1980s, the idea of mandating strike ballots had moved off the 
American labour law reform agenda and there was an absence of discussion 
of the issue in academic writings of the time.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the idea of requiring strike ballots re-emerged as 
part of labor law reform proposals from two different leading labour law 
academics. Samuel Estreicher proposed a series of reforms to strike law as 
part of a response to concerns about the Mackay Radio doctrine allowing the 
hiring of permanent replacement workers.32 Estreicher proposed a limitation 
on the use of permanent replacements to situations where the employer had 
made a prior showing of business necessity for their use and a right of 
reinstatement during the first 6 months of a strike even where permanent 
replacements had been used. As part of this package of reforms, Estreicher 
proposed that a strike vote on the employer’s final offer be made mandatory 
so as to ensure the individual union members had full and accurate 
information before entering into the strike.33 Paul Weiler similarly offered a 
package of reform proposals to reinvigorate US labour law.34 Weiler’s 
proposals were broader in including accelerated election procedures, rapid 
reinstatement of workers fired for union organising, limitations on the good 
faith bargaining requirement, and relaxation of the rules limiting non-union 
employee representation. In regard to strike law, Weiler proposed a full repeal 
of the Mackay doctrine allowing permanent replacements. He argued that 
requiring a strike ballot on the employer’s final offer would complement these 
reforms by showing Congress that even though union representation would be 
easier to obtain, employees would have full opportunity to participate in the 
key decision to engage in industrial conflict.
Although eloquently argued, neither of these proposals has yet emerged into 
the broader public policy realm, or the legislative arena. It is noteworthy that 
both authors suggesting adoption of mandatory strike ballots offered it as part 
of a package of reforms that would overall shift American labour law in a 
more union favourable direction. By contrast, labour law policy proposals 
from the employer-side have generally not focused on the issue of strike 
ballots. Rather the focuses of employer community proposals have been on 
loosening the restrictions on non-union employee representation plans under 
s 8(a)(2) of the NLRA and on limiting union use of dues money and agency 
fees, ideally through federal legislation that would extend so-called right to 
work laws at a national level. Over recent decades, strike ballot laws have not 
been on the policy agenda of American employers and there is no indication 
that they will emerge as a priority.
31 Anton, above n 13, at 8-9.
32 S Estreicher, ‘Collective Bargaining or “Collective Begging”?: Reflections on 
Antistrikebreaker Legislation’ (1994) 93 Mich LR 577.
33 Ibid, at 607.
34 P C Weiler, ‘A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century’ (2001) 3 
University Pennsylvania Journal of Labor & Employment Law 177.
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The Fading Threat of Strikes in the US '
At this point, we have arrived at the Holmesian ‘dog that did not bark’.35 Why 
have strike ballot laws not been a major issue in the US in recent years? 
Passage of strike ballot laws was a component of the Thatcher era labour law 
reforms introduced in the United Kingdom in the 1980s designed to weaken 
the power of British unions. The US experienced a similar conservative shift 
in its political economy during the Reagan era of the 1980s, with reducing 
union power also being one of its signature achievements.36 Part of the story 
may simply be the use of other means to achieve the same end. Efforts to limit 
union strike power in the US focused on the elaboration of the use of 
permanent replacement workers to weaken union strike power and ultimately 
lead to the elimination of union representation in many workplaces. The 
combination of the availability of the Mackay Radio doctrine and the powerful 
political symbolism of the defeat of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization strike in 1981 through the use of permanent replacements helped 
lead American political conservatives and employers to emphasise this 
weapon in undermining union strike power.37
In subsequent years, the lack of attention to strike ballot laws in the US 
likely also reflects the steady weakening of the bargaining power of American 
unions and the increasing rarity of resort to the strike weapon to exert that 
power. The long, steady decline of union representation in the US is well 
known. From a high of around 30-35% of the workforce in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s,38 the union membership rate had shrunk to 20.1% by 1983 and 
further contracted only 11.1% in 2014.39 The parallel decline in strike rates 
over this same period has been even more dramatic. Between 1950 and 1979, 
there was an average of 308 major strikes (involving 1000 or more workers) 
each year in the US, idling on average some 1.439 million workers. By 
contrast, in 1983 there were only 81 major strikes involving 909,000 workers 
and by 2013 there were only 15 major strikes idling only 55,000 workers.40 
Strikes do still occur in the US, but they are much less frequent and pose much 
less threat to employers. Given the dramatic weakening of the strike threat, it 
is unsurprising that employers are less focused on the need for additional legal 
measures to ward off this threat.
If the purpose of strike ballot laws is to protect the democratic interests of 
union members, then the weakening of the economic power of the strike 
weapon might not matter for this policy goal. But if the real purpose of strike 
ballot laws is as a tool to reduce industrial conflict and to diminish the threat 
of the strike weapon in collective bargaining, then a weakened strike threat
35 In ‘The Adventure o f Silver Blaze’ by Arthur Conan Doyle, the failure o f the watchdog to 
bark at a night-time intruder is a key clue allowing Holmes to solve the case:
Inspector Gregory: ‘Is there any other point to which you would draw my attention?’ 
Sherlock Holmes: ‘To the curious incident o f the dog in the night-time.’
Gregory: ‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’
Holmes: ‘That was the curious incident.’
36 See generally Colvin and Darbishire, above n 2.
37 See Rosenblum, above n 9.
38 Katz et, above n 27, at 126.
39 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2014, BLS, Washington DC, 2015.
40 Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Work Stoppages Summary, BLS, Washington DC, 2014.
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diminishes the urgency of this policy goal. The absence of employer side 
efforts in the US to enact strike ballot laws as the urgency of the strike threat 
has diminished provides at least some suggestive evidence from a comparative 
perspective that these laws are primarily about this latter policy goal.
Union Constitutional Provisions and Practices
The absence of legal mandates requiring strike ballots does not complete the 
story of strike votes in the US. While labour law statutes have only required 
strike ballots in the limited circumstances already described, in practice many 
union constitutions require pre-strike votes and they are widely used to 
provide authorisation for strikes.
Provisions in union constitutions requiring strike votes were already widely 
adopted by the 1950s. A 1954 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study 
reviewing 133 union constitutions found that 78 of them (59%) required a 
local union strike vote before the local could call a strike.41 Most of these 
constitutional provisions required a supra-majority to approve the strike. 
Among the provisions reviewed in the study, 19 required a simple majority, 33 
required a two-thirds majority, and 11 required a three-quarters majority, while 
13 did not specify a required majority level.42
To provide an updated picture of union constitutional provisions requiring 
strike votes, I replicated the 1954 BLS study using current US union 
constitutions. The number of unions has shrunk during the interim years, due 
in part to an ongoing process of union merger consolidation. Of the 44 current 
union constitutions examined, 28 of them (64%) included provisions requiring 
a vote before a strike was authorised. Many of these provisions also continue 
to require a supra-majority to authorise a strike, with 14 specifying such a 
level, mostly a two-thirds majority. These numbers are likely to somewhat 
underestimate the total extent of union strike ballot requirements as they only 
include such provisions in the national constitutions of the unions. Some of 
the unions that lack strike ballot provisions in their constitutions have local 
unions that include strike ballot rules in their own local constitutions. Overall, 
what these results indicate is that most American unions do require strike 
ballots under the internal rules governing the operation of the union. Rather 
than strike ballots being imposed on unions by external labour law, in the US 
they have developed as an internal expression of democratic governance of the 
unions.
The strike ballot provisions found in union constitutions are detailed rules 
governing the circumstances under which a strike will be authorised. One 
representative example is the provision in the constitution of the United 
Autoworkers:
Section 1. (a) When a dispute exists between an employer and a Local Union 
concerning the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement or any other 
strikeable issue the Local Union or the International Executive Board may issue a 
call for a strike vote. All members must be given due notice of the vote to be taken
41 Bureau of Labor Statistics, ‘Strike-Control Provisions in Union Constitutions’ (1954) 77 
Monthly Lab Rev 497.
42 Ibid. Among the provisions reviewed, 19 required a simple majority, 33 required a 
two-thirds majority, 11 required a three-quarters majority.
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and it shall require a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote by secret ballot of those voting 
to request strike authorization from the International Executive Board. Only 
members in good standing shall be entitled to vote.43
Many union constitution strike ballot provisions include relatively detailed 
rules governing how these votes will be conducted. Interestingly, one example 
is the provisions in the constitution of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, historically the American union most famously associated in the 
public mind with union corruption and ties to organised crime. Many of those 
problems at the Teamsters were cleaned up when the union entered into an 
agreement in 1989 accepting federal government oversight of its operations, 
though this oversight only came to an end in early 2015. The current 
Teamsters constitution now provides detailed rules for strike ballots:
(b) Agreements shall either be accepted by a majority vote of those members 
involved in negotiations and voting, or a majority of such members shall 
direct further negotiations before a final vote on the employer’s offer is 
taken, as directed by the Local Union Executive Board. During negotiations, 
the Local Union Executive Board may order a secret ballot strike vote to be 
taken and when, in the judgment of the Local Union Executive Board, an 
employer has made a final offer of settlement, such offer must be submitted 
to the involved membership for a secret ballot vote as hereinafter provided:
(1) If at least one half of the members eligible to vote cast valid ballots, 
then a cumulative majority of those voting in favor of the final offer 
shall result in acceptance of such offer; and a cumulative majority of 
those voting against acceptance of the final offer shall authorize a 
strike without any additional vote being necessary for such strike 
authorization. In the event of a tie vote on either a motion to accept a 
final offer or to strike, the Local Union Executive Board shall conduct 
a second vote. If the result of the second vote is a tie, the Local Union 
Executive Board shall have the discretion to either accept the final 
offer or reject the final offer and authorize a strike at such time as it 
determines.
(2) If less than half of the eligible members cast valid ballots, then a 
two-thirds (2/3) vote of those voting shall be required to reject such 
final offer and to authorize a strike. The failure of such membership to 
reject the final offer and to authorize a strike as herein provided shall 
require the Local Union Executive Board to accept such final offer or 
such additional provisions as can be negotiated by it. When the final 
offer has been rejected in accordance with this Section, it shall 
constitute authorization for a strike at such time and under such terms 
and conditions as the Local Union Executive Board may determine. 
Any question arising from the application or interpretation of this 
Section shall be decided by the General President whose decision 
shall be final.44
A key feature of these provisions is that they condition support of the national 
union, including the payment of strike pay from the union’s strike fund, on the 
holding and outcome of a strike vote. As a result, the use of the union’s
43 Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, as amended at the 36th UAW Constitutional Convention, 
(June 2014) art 50.
44 Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters art XII.
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primary economic weapon of the strike is conditioned on the execution of the 
democratic process of union self-government through the strike vote.
The role of strike ballots as an expression of union democratic governance 
can also be seen in the practice of strikes in the US. When American unions 
contemplate authorising a strike, it is common practice to hold a strike ballot 
to ensure membership support. A search of strikes in 2014 reported in the 
Daily Labor Report, the leading US specialty news source for labour issues, 
indicated that in all cases that could be identified the union had conducted a 
strike vote prior to engaging in the strike.
Why did American unions adopt strike ballots so widely in the absence of 
legal mandates to do so? One plausible explanation is the value in bargaining 
of being able to demonstrate union membership support for using the strike 
weapon. Given that US labour law casts the use of the strike weapon as the 
key source of union bargaining power in negotiating a new contract, 
demonstrating the viability of a strike through a ballot provides a natural 
mechanism for American unions to strengthen their position at the bargaining 
table. It is also the case that the US labour relations system has had an historic 
focus on issues of union democracy and American labour law has opened 
internal union affairs up to a high degree of scrutiny.45 One prominent 
example of this is the legal requirement for secret ballot elections in union 
organising campaigns to determine majority support for union representation. 
Notably the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act amended the National Labor Relations 
Act to provide additional oversight of internal union operations in response to 
public concerns about union corruption.46 The Landrum-Griffin Act 
amendments included a union members ‘bill of rights’ providing for rights to 
attendance at union meetings, to vote in elections for union leadership, and not 
to be treated unfairly by the union. Although these amendments did not 
include strike ballot requirements, they encouraged the general adoption of 
democratic procedures in internal union decision-making. Given the 
widespread use of voting procedures in other internal union decisions, it is not 
at all surprising that American unions would also use membership ballots as 
a mechanism for the crucial decision of whether not to engage in a strike.
Conclusion
Reviewing the issue of strike ballots in US labour law produces a tale of two 
different realms of law. In the realm of formal labour law enacted in statutes, 
we see a history of experimentation with strike ballot requirements in special 
wartime legislation during World War II and for national emergency disputes 
under the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. These experiments were deemed largely 
unsuccessful due to their limited effectiveness in achieving the policy goal of 
reducing industrial conflict. The underlying theory behind this policy, that 
union leaders were pushing reluctant union members into strikes against their 
own desires, was considered to be discredited in practice with union members
45 S M Lipset, M A Trow, and J S Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the 
International Typographical Union, Free Press, New York, 1956; G Strauss, ‘Union 
Democracy’ in G Strauss, D G Gallagher and J Fiorito (Eds), The State of the Unions, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1991, chap 6.
46 Katz, Kochan and Colvin, above n 27, at 60-1.
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widely supporting strikes in the ballots that were held. No new strike ballot 
laws were proposed on the legislative reform agenda and the existing 
Taft-Hartley provisions fell into disuse from the 1970s on.
In the realm of labour law statutes, the US story of strike ballots is one of 
the ‘dog that did not bark’. With the waning of American union strike power 
and the availability of permanent replacements as an alternative legal weapon 
against strikes, there has been a lack of need to turn to strike ballots as a 
mechanism for limiting industrial conflict.
However, when we turn to the realm of internal union governance and 
practice, we see a very different picture. Strike ballots are widely required in 
union constitutions. Votes of their membership are commonly taken by 
American unions before a strike is authorised. If the concern behind strike 
ballots is to ensure democratic participation in the governance of unions, 
particularly in such a major decision as to engage in a strike, then the picture 
of US labour relations is a positive one. In this area we see a manifestation of 
what Ellickson described as ‘Order without Law’. In the behavior of the actors 
we see the emergence of sets of practices that reflect a commonly accepted set 
of norms. This process of institutionalisation of practices may not have the 
universality or enforceability of formal law, but nevertheless provides a 
widely accepted set of rules governing behavior. As such, it draws our 
attention in understanding labour law beyond the formal realm of statutes to 
a broader set of rules, norms, and structures that govern the practice of labour 
relations.
